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762 FINNEGAN ". FINNEGAN [42C.2d 
[L. A. 22394. In Bank. May. 4, 1954.] 
LOUISE M. S. FINNEGAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. 
WILLIAM J. FINNEGAN. Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Se.-A husband and 
wife may contract with respect to their property (Civ. Code, 
§ 158), and if they are living separate and apart they may 
provide for support and maintenance of either of them and 
their children. (Civ. Code, § 159.) 
[2] Divorce - Permanent Alimony - Modi1l.cation of Allowance-
Effect of Agreement of Parties.-As between husband and wife, 
if provisions in an agreement by them for support and main-
tenance have been made an integral or inseverable part of 
divisiOD 0' their property, and court in a divorce or separate 
maintenance action has approved agreement, its provisions can-
not thereafter be modified without consent of both parties. 
[3] Id. - Separate Maintenance - Modi1l.cation of Allowance.-
Where husband and wife while living separate and apart 
entered into a valid contract settling both their property and 
support rights and secured its approval and adoption by 
court as basis for a final judgment of separate maintenance, 
and where wife has accepted benefits of agreement, husband 
has at all times performed his obligations thereunder, and 
neither party has given the other grounds for abrogating 
agreement, the agreement is binding on them and court, and 
court cannot modify payments or a.ward costs and attorney 
fees contrary to its terms. 
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Loa 
Angeles County denying increased allowance for wife sup-
port and directing husband to pay attorneys' fees and costs 
of appeal. Elmer D. Doyle and Mildred L. Lillie. Judges. 
Order denying increased allowance, affirm~d; other order re-
versed. 
J eny Giesler and Harold C. Holland for Plainti1f and 
Appellant. 
A. A. Goldstone for Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Husband and Wife, § 44 et seq.; Am.Jur., Hus-
band and Wife, § 252 et seq. 
[2J See Am.Jur .• Divorce and Separation, § 643 et seq. 
Melt. Dig. References: fl] Rn!;band and Wife, § 154; [2] 
Divorce, § 216(1); [3] Divol'ce, § 111. 
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TRAYNOR, J.-LI 1943 plaintiff secured 8 decree of sep-
arate maintenance 8'\t ttrding her all of the community prop-
erty and $100 per month for the support of the minor son 
of the parties. On defendant's appeal the decree was af-
firmed as to these provisions but reversed insofar as it ordered 
a sale of certain property by 8 receiver. (Finnegan v. Finne-
gan, 64 Cal.App.2d 109 [148 P.2d 37].) Thereafter the par-
ties entered into a property settlement agreement, which by 
stipulation was adopted as the basis for a final judgment 
of separate maintenance. The stipulation provided that "the 
provisions of the property settlement agreement between the 
parties dated April 14, 1944, are intended to be and are in 
. full and complete settlement of the property rights and obliga-
tions which are or could be litigated in the above entitled 
action. [T 1 he parties have read and are familiar with 
the judgment attached hereto, are desirous that it be exe-
cuted and consent that it may be signed by any judge of the 
Superior Court for Los Angeles County.. . [S] aid judg-
ment when signed and filed shall be in complete satisfaction 
of the mutual rights and obligations of the parties hereto 
respecting all matters litigated in this action whether or not 
covered by or included in the judgment heretofore and on 
May 20. 1943 filed and entered herein." The judgment pro-
vided that plaintiff was entitled to live separate and apart 
from defendant. approved the property settlement agreement, 
and provided that in conformity with its terms "defendant 
be and he is hereby ordered to pay to said plaintiff the sums 
for alimony and support of herself and minor son as provided 
in Paragraph Five of said Agreement. said payments to be 
at the rate of Two Hundred Seventy Dollars ($270.00) per 
month commencing August 5th, 1944. until said monthly sums 
are reduced as provided in said Agreement. " The agree-
ment. which was attached to the judgment and incorporated 
therein in its entirety by reference. recited that the parties 
were living separate and apart and that'they bad agreed 
"upon a mutual property settlement pertaining to all the 
property of every kind. nature and description. belonging to 
them. or either of them, and to be a complete and final settle-
ment of their mutual rights and claim!'l of every kind and 
nature whatsoever. "The agreement then listed the prop-
erty in which one or both of the parties asserted an interest 
and made detailed provisions for its division. Paragraph five 
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and support for plaintiff and the minor son of the parties. 
These payments were to be reduced to $170 per month when 
the son either died, married, became of age, or became self-
supporting, and were to terminate on the death or remarriage 
of plaintiff. It was also provided that if defendant sold certain 
patents, plaintiff should receive half of the amount realized, 
and if she received $25,000 from this source, the $170 per 
month alimony should terminate. If she received less than 
$25,000, the payments should be reduced pro tanto. Para-
graph 13 provided that "The property received by each of 
the parties hereto. respectively, and the agreements herein 
contained are received and made by each of the parties hereto 
in full of all claims and rights of every kind, nature and 
description, which either party hereto may have or claim to 
have against the other now or hereafter, including any rights 
or relief with respect to property or maintenance which [plain-
tiff] might obtain in said action D-224. 875. and in full for 
all claims and rights which either party hereto would have 
upon the estate of the other, and is in lieu of all rights which 
the law would give the other as husband or wife. or as a sur-
viving husband or wife .... " The agreement also contained 
a waiver by plaintiff of court costs and attorney fees. and 
provided that after-acquired property should be the separate 
property of the party acquiring it. In 1950 plaintiff peti-
tioned the court for an increase in the -amount of the monthly 
payments for the support of herself and the minor son. The 
court awarded an additional $75 per month for the support 
of the son but denied any increase for plaintiff's support on 
the ground that the provision for monthly payments was an 
inseparable part of the property settlement agreement. Plain-
tiff appealed and secured an order for costs and attorney fees 
on appeal. and defendant appealed from the latter order. 
If the provision for monthly payments pursuant to the 
terms of the property settlement agreement had been entered 
by the court in a divorce action. it is clear that it could not 
be modified. [1] "A husband and wife may contract 
with respect to their property (Civ. Code. § 158), and if they 
are living separate and apart they may provide for the sup-
port and maintenance of either of them and their children. 
(Civ. Code, § 159.) [2] Moreover, as between the husband 
and wife, if the provisions for support and maintenance have 
been made an integral or inseverable part of the division of 
their property, and the court in a divorce action has approved 
the qreement, its provisions cannot thereafter be modified 
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without the consent of both of the partit's." (Dexter v. Dex-
ter, ante, pp. 36, 40-41 [265 P.2d 873J ; st't' also Fox v. Fox, 
ante, pp. 49, 52 [265 P.2d 881 J.) In this ease, as in the 
Dexter and Fox cases. the parties made the provisions for 
support and maintenance of plaintiff an integral part of their 
property settlement agreemt'nt. They stated that they wished 
to settle all of their "mutual rights and claims of every kind 
and nature whatsoever," and provided that the "property 
received by each of the parties hereto. respt'ctively, and the 
agreements herein contained are received and made by each 
of the parties hereto in full of all claims and rights of every 
kind. nature and description ... including any right or 
relief with respect to property or maintenance . . . and . . . 
in lieu of all rights which the law would give the other as 
husband or wife." Accordingly, plaintiff may not be awarded 
additional support and maintenance without changing the 
property settlement agreement of the parties. 
Plaintiff contends, however, in reliance on Monroe v. 
Superior Oourl, 28 Ca1.2d 427 r170 P.2d 473], and Verdier 
v. Verdier, 36 Ca1.2d 241 [223 P.2d 214], that while the 
parties remain married the court has continuing jurisdiction 
to modify the support and maintenance provisions of a 
separate maintenance decree. and that the parties cannot. by 
making the support provisions an integral part of a property 
settlement, prevent the court from exercising its power of 
modification. Neither of the cited cases supports this con-
tention. In the Monroe case no property settlement agree-
ment was involved, and it was held that the fact that support 
payments under a separate maintenance decree had terminated 
according to its terms did not prevent the court from modify-
ing its decree to provide for additional. payments in the 
future. In the Verdier case it was held that the existence of 
an unperformed separation agreement did not prevent the 
court from granting separate maintenance under section] 37 of 
the Civil Code on the ground that the husband had wilfully 
failed to support his wife. [3] In the present case. on the 
other hand. the parties while living separate and apart entered 
into a valid contract settling both their property and support 
rights and secured its approval and adoption by the court. 
Plaintiff has accepted the benefits of the agreement, and de-
fendant has at all times performed his obli~ations thereunder. 
The situation has not been l11terrcl b~' an nnacc('pted offrr of 
reconciliation (see Oardinale v. Cardinale, 8 Ca1.2d 762, 
766 FINNEGAN V. FINNEGAN [42 C.2d 
768 [68 P.2d 351]), or by a reconciliation (see Estate of 
Boeson, 201 Cal. 36, 42-43 [255 P. 800] ; 1 Armstrong, Cali-
fornia Family Law, pp. 582-584; see, also, Barham v. Barham. 
33 Cal.2d 416. 427-429 [202 P.2d 289]), and neither of the 
parties has given the other grounds for abrogating the a~ree­
ment. (See Verdier v. Verdier, 36 Ca1.2d 241, 245-246 [223 
P .2d 214].) Thus, neither of the parties has done anythin~ 
that would affect their status as spouses living separate and 
apart under the terms of their contract as approved and in-
corporated in the judgment. (See London Gttar. &- Ace. Co. 
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 181 Cal. 460. 466 [184 P. 864]; 
Sargent v. Sargent, 106 Cal. 541, 545-546 [39 P. 931].) Under 
these circumstances there is no reasonable basis for holding 
that their agreement is not binding upon them and the court. 
Accordingly, the court cannot modify the payments or award 
costs and attorney fees contrary to its terms. 
The order denying modification of the judgment to increase 
tlip support and maintenance payments to plaintiff is affirmerl. 
The order awarding costs and attorney fees is reversed. 
Each side shall hear its own costs on these appeals. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Spence, J., and Bray, J. pro tem.,· 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached in the 
majority opinion but my reasons for this conclusion are ex-
pressed in my dissents in Monroe v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 
2d 427, 432 [170 P.2d 473]; Verdier v. Verdier, 36 Ca1.2d 
241, 249 [223 P.2d 214]; Dexter v. Dexter, ante, pp. 36. 
44 [265 P.2d 873] ; Fox v. Fox, ante, pp. 49, 53 [265 P.2d 
881] ; Flynn v. Flynn, ante. pp. 55. 62 r265 P.2d865J. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the judglllent and generally in 
the holdings of the opinion. I expressly disavow, howevcr, 
the implication, if any such be otherwise construable, that, 
a valid contract having heen entered into. the validity or effect 
or enforceability of that contract could be in anywise altered 
by the unilateral act of either party. 
• Aui&ned bl (;hail'lllaJl of Judicial ()oUllClJ. 
